Tax Blog/Blawg

Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) may have tried to take a bite out of Apple (AAPL) in congressional hearings last May examining the company’s overseas tax structure, calling it “the holy grail of tax avoidance." However, it appears that more than just Irish eyes are smiling on the company these days, for in the eyes of the SEC, Apple’s efforts to minimize its tax burden are just fine thank you.  See e.g., O'Brian, Chris, "SEC reveals review of Apple's Irish tax disclosures." Los Angeles Times, 3 Oct. 2013, LATimes.com, 9 Oct. 2013.

But is that the happy end of the story for Apple and the ...

TaxBlawg’s Guest Commentator, David L. Bernard, is the former Vice President of Taxes for Kimberly-Clark Corporation, a past president of the Tax Executives Institute, and a periodic contributor to TaxBlawg.

My last blog post suggested that the best defense against transfer pricing assessments is the adoption of a globally consistent transfer pricing policy supported by appropriate documentation. Near the conclusion of that post, I noted that the Competent Authority (CA) process and Advance Pricing Agreements (“APAs”) were tools that could be employed if your company faced transfer pricing adjustments.

Although the goal of your transfer pricing policy and related documentation is to manage risk and avoid tax assessments, the nature of the beast is such that there is no precise price one can pinpoint in transfer pricing matters that can completely eliminate the risk of a tax authority’s challenge. Rather, there is usually a range of potential prices that may be appropriate. A tax authority may be inclined to pick a price at the end of the range most favorable to its country from a revenue perspective, leaving the Chief Tax Officer (CTO) to consider a menu of potential remedies, including administrative appeals, litigation, APAs, or perhaps a request for CA assistance.

TaxBlawg’s Guest Commentator, David L. Bernard, is the recently retired Vice President of Taxes for Kimberly-Clark Corporation, a past president of the Tax Executives Institute, and a periodic contributor to TaxBlawg.

My recent post titled The Repatriation Dilemma: Cash may be King, but is Earnings Per Share the Ace of Trump? discussed how taxes may be one of the reasons why cash is building in the balance sheets of corporate America. Specifically, the U.S. tax cost that may result from repatriating cash earned outside the U.S. in low-tax jurisdictions may simply be too high. While shareholders wonder why cash build-ups are not resulting in increases in share buy-backs and dividends, company executives “doing the math” conclude that spending up to a third of the cash in U.S. taxes to repatriate is not prudent.

The post triggered much interest. There have been phone interviews with both the Wall Street Journal and CFO Magazine regarding potential stories. A former Chief Tax Officer (CTO) recalled similar analyses and decisions during his “in-house” days, but did not take issue with the conclusion. Another reader lamented that it was just another example of how U.S. multinationals choose not to take part in the U.S. economy. (Hmmm, do you wonder if he or she purposely pays more tax than legally obligated?) In any event the level of interest in this topic suggested that a sequel is warranted.

TaxBlawg’s Guest Commentator, David L. Bernard, is the recently retired Vice President of Taxes for Kimberly-Clark Corporation, a past president of the Tax Executives Institute, and a periodic contributor to TaxBlawg.

The financial press can’t stop talking about the amount of cash on corporate balance sheets. Journalists and arm-chair analysts alike point to the $1.84 trillion in cash on the balance sheets of non-financial U.S. companies as a reason to be bullish on the stock market, figuring that eventually cash-rich companies will splurge on dividends and stock buy-backs, if not on pursuing growth opportunities. There’s probably truth to that, but there is also a good chance that some of the cash will never be spent. Why? Because much of this largesse has been earned outside the United States in low tax jurisdictions, and repatriating this would cost billions in cash taxes and earnings.

The Chief Tax Officer (“CTO”), CFO and Corporate Treasurer have many discussions on the desire to return cash to the U.S. and the amount of the resulting “hit” to income that would result. Some companies may have more of a tolerance for the reduction in earnings per share attendant with repatriation of low taxed earnings than others, but the growth in cash in corporate balance sheets suggests that earnings per share still trumps the desire to return cash to the U.S. when the tax burden is too great.

TaxBlawg’s Guest Commentator, David L. Bernard, is the recently retired Vice President of Taxes for Kimberly-Clark Corporation, a past president of the Tax Executives Institute, and a periodic contributor to TaxBlawg.

As the IRS sifts through dozens of comment letters on the proposed disclosure of uncertain tax positions, in-house tax officers have to wonder what's next. Over the last decade, CTO's have been hit with a barrage of new demands and worries. We have seen the rise of FIN 48 (now ASC 740-10), Sarbanes-Oxley and the resulting increased focus on controls, increasingly burdensome quarterly and annual attest firm reviews, listed transactions disclosures, the electronic filing mandate (Everson's legacy), Schedule M-3, and now the still proposed UTP disclosure.

Notwithstanding the new challenges, the number one performance metric used to judge a tax department's performance is still the effective tax rate ("ETR"). CTO's and their staffs continue to be measured by their delivery on the ETR at a time when most at the IRS seem to believe that all tax planning is bad, outside counsel is becoming more cautious, attest firms are insisting to review opinions (thus jeopardizing privilege), budgets and head count have been cut and, oh by the way, "cash is king".